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Introduction
According to a widespread view, industrialization prospects
of non-oil developing countries (NOPECs) have been seriously
affected by the drastic rise in oil prices during the last
2
decade . It is pointed out that the share of fuels in total
imports doubled within two years to more than 17 percent (1974)
and that higher oil import bills contributed considerably to
enlarged balance of payments deficits. Apart from some already
advanced NOPECs, whose favourable credit standing in inter-
national capital markets allowed them to finance their defi-
cits, many Third World countries were faced with the situation
where equilibrium in external trade had to be restored by cutt-
ing imports. This seemed all the more necessary as the demand
of developed countries for NOPEC-exports slackened because of
a cyclical slow-down and intensified protectionist pressures .
Especially those NOPECs which traditionally had restricted
imports of consumer goods were now forced to reduce the foreign
supply of intermediates and capital goods, actually urgently
needed for carrying out their industrialization programs.
Nonetheless, although NOPECs were confronted with quadrupling
oil. prices and other external shocks, the average annual growth
rate after the oil shock of 1973/74 remained at about 5 percent
for the g^roup as a whole; this was hardly 1 percentage point
less the increase in real gross domestic product experienced
4
in the late sixties and early seventies . Given this constella-
te-
Juergen B. Donges und Dean Spinanger provided helpful corments on an
earlier draft.
The group of NOPECs includes all net oil importing developing
countries and those Third World economies whose oil exports
constitute only a minor share in their external trade.
2
Following the first oil price shock of 1973/74, which is the
topic of this paper, NOPECs have been hit once again by the
second rise in oil prices in 1979/80. Since the period to
analyse the second oil shock is still rather short and because
of data limitations, we confine ourselves to a short qualifi-
cation in the concluding remarks.
See Balassa (1981a); Agarwal, Glismann, Nunnenkamp (1983).
4
By contrast, the average GDP increase of 2.5 percent for in-
dustrial countries after 1973 was only half the growth rate
in 1967-73.- 2 -
tion, an empirical evaluation of the hypothesis that the oil
price rise has had a significantly negative impact on indu-
strial production of NOPECs in the seventies would seem to be
fitting. In the following it is attempted to separate longer-
term effects from an oil price induced once-and-for-all loss
in industrial production applying time series analysis for
7 NOPECs. Different production functions are estimated for
the industrial sectors of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Phi-
lippines, Singapore, South Korea and Tunisia. Compared with .
many other NOPECs this sample mainly consists of countries
characterized by relatively high levels of industrialization
and overall development; their economies thus might be espe-
cially sensitive to the oil price shock. On the other hand,
quite different economies are analysed, for example with re-
spect to the degree of dependency on energy imports (ranging,
from net energy exporters like Colombia and Tunisia to fully
import dependent economies) and trade policies persued (Table 1);
this may allow us to identify" some factors which may determine
the effects of the oil price rise on industrial production.
Measuring oil price effects
Similar to other studies concerned with the economic situa-
tion of developed countries after the oil shock of 1973/74
this paper applies production function analysis and isolates
the oil price effect on industrial production in the above
mentioned 7 NOPECs . Using time series data generally ranging
from 1962 to 1979 the basic regression (I) run reads as:
lnV = A + alnL + BlnC + 6lnEP
See for example Tatom (1981); Rasche, Tatom (1981);
Cooper (1980).— "3 —
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a Share of net imports of commercial energy in total domestic consumption of commercial
energy in 1973. A negative sign indicates net energy exporting countries. - "In
1973. - c imports of SITC 332 (petroleum products) only. -
 d In the period 1973-79. -
e In 1975. - f Share of exports of SITC 5-8 (minus SITC 68) in total exports.
Sources: UN, World Energy Supplies, New York, var. iss. - UN, Yearbook of International
Trade Statistics, New York, var. iss. - World Bank, World Bank Atlas 1977,
Washington, D.C., 1977. - World Bank, World Tables, The Second Edition (1980),
Washington, D.C., 1980.- 4 -
where
V = Value added of manufacturing industry at constant
prices;
L = Average number of persons engaged in manufacturing
industry;
C = Quantity of electricity consumed in manufacturing
industry as a proxy for capital inputs ;
EP = Relative price of oil (1973 = 100)
2.
The coefficients a and 3 represent partial output elasticities
of labour and capital respectively; 6 denotes the percentage
change in V if the relative price of oil changes by one percent.
According to the above stated hypothesis a significantly nega-
tive value of 6 is to be expected because of rising oil prices
in the seventies.
Supplementary equation types II, III and IV are estimated:
- In type II, a time trend (T) is added to the production
function of type I allowing for long-term developments in
industrial production.
- Equation type III reads as:
lnV = A + yD + alnL + BlnC + 61nEP;
D stands for a dummy-variable which takes the value "0" for
the period 1962-73 and "1" for the years after the oil price
shock; by this it is attempted to separate the effect the oil
price rise had on the growth rate of industrial production from
an once-and-for-all reduction in industry's value added which
might have been caused by the sudden increase in oil import
bills in 1974; if the last mentioned effect is neglected - as
in equation types I and II - the longer-term impact of the oil
This, for sure, is not the best way of measuring capital in-
puts: It may be that the amount of electricity consumed per
unit of capital declined with rising oil prices; in this case
the actual input of capital will be higher than reported by
C. Nevertheless, lacking time series data on capital stocks
and assuming that electricity and capital are rather comple-r
^mentary inputs, it seemed to be a second-best approach.
Nominal prices of oil in national currencies were deflated
by overall consumer price indices.- 5 -
price variable on industrial performance will probably
be overestimated.
- Type IV combines both modifications, the inclusion of
a time trend and the dummy-variable.
Two problems of this approach of measuring oil price ef-
fects on industrial production are evident. Firstly,it
has to be considered that elasticities estimated in equations
I -IV reflect the impact of marginal changes in inde-
pendent variables on industrial production.
In case of drastic changes coefficients may differ
from estimated values and can no longer be used for cal-
culating exactly the quantitative impact on value-added
in the country's industry. For the oil price variable
such a drastic jump took place in 1973/74 when relative
oil prices on an average nearly tripled. So the coeffi-
cient 6 should be regarded as indicating the tendency of
oil price induced influences on industrial production
rather than the exact quantitative impact of the oil price
shock of 1973/7 4. This does not exclude comparing the ef-
fects rising oil prices have had on industrial performance
in different countries, especially in cases of equation
types III and IV where the inclusion of the dummy-variable
will reduce distortions in elasticities at least to a
great extent.
Secondly, only the direct impact will be assessed by pro-
duction function analysis (indicated by 6).Additionally,
energy prices might have caused indirect effects, for example,
if they have given rise to an intensified substitution
between different factors of production. Energy and capi-
tal being rather complementary inputs, industrial produc-
tion might have been affected by a slackening,
capital formation. On the other hand, this effect could
have been offset by an extended use of labour.- 6 -
In the following, the impact of this kind of oil price induced
adjustment process on industrial production is left out
of account. To what extent results will be affected by
this depends not only on the degree of indirect effects but
also on the space of time they need to become effective.
If adjustment will take a rather long time,results won't
be distorted significantly. To check this, the following
two regressions are run for each of the seven developing
countries regarded:
lnC = a + a..lnV + a2lnEP
lnL = bQ + b.jlnV + b2lnEP
Negative indirect effects of rising oil prices on indu-
strial production in the seventies are most likely to
expect if coefficients a- arid b0 are significantly ne-
gative; offsetting influences will be indicated by posi-
tive-signed coefficients a~ or b?.
Empirical results
Examining first regression type I,results vary widely be-
tween the 7 NOPECs analysed (Table 2): For only two coun-
tries, Brazil and the Philippines, the hypothesis of a
significantly negative impact of rising oil prices on in-
dustrial production is supported at the 5 percent level of
confidence. Both economies are characterized by a high
degree of dependency on energy imports going along with
high shares of oil imports in total exports and sharp
increases in these shares after the oil price shock of
1973/74 (see Table 1). In addition, world market
orientation was rather weak . The
In addition to indicators of Table 1 see Balassa (1981b)- 7 -















































































































































































































































































































































For specification of variables see the text. The numbers in parentheses beneath the



































































: 2. 5 percent- 8 -
adjustment process of national industries to higher
energy costs might have been hampered because of a re-
latively bad export performance for manufactured goods;
although both economies were already well advanced in
terms of industrialization levels reached, neither Bra-
zil nor the Philippines were able to enlarge their world
export market shares after the oil price shock compared
to the early seventies.
In a second country group the oil price induced effects
were either weak (Chile, Tunisia) - both in terms of the
value of the oil price coefficient and its level of signi-
ficance - or even insignificant (Colombia). For Colombia
and Tunisia this may largely be the consequence of both
countries being net energy exporters. Although exported
shares of domestically produced commercial energy declined
in both cases after 1973 , self-sufficiency in
energy protected them from being hit by OPEC-caused
external shocks; on the other handfColombian and Tunisian oil
exports were too low to participate theirselves in the oil
price boom to a considerable extent
6. Among the 5 net im-
porters of energy Chile was the only country where domestic
supply contributed to more than 50 percent to national
consumption of commercial energy throughout the seventies.
Merely a small part of exports was necessary to pay for
oil import bills. Furthermore, the adjustment process to
higher energy prices might have been supported by an intensified
world market orientation of the Chilean economy as indicated
by rising shares of exports in gross domestic product which
had been achieved although copper prices declined drastically
Starting from an extremely low level (3.6 percent in 1973) the
share of manufactured goods in total exports tripled within
3-4 years.
^In 1979, Colombia has become a net importer of commercial
energy.
Tunisia, to some extent, could take advantage of the rise
in export prices for phosphates which largely was a conse-
quence of the oil price shock.
3However, the disadvantageous development in copper prices was
the principal factor which caused average world export market
shares to decline from 0.3 percent (1970-73) to 0.2 percent
(1974-79). In Colombia market shares remained nearly stable
comparing averages before and after the oil price shock of
1973/74 whereas Tunisia was successful in strengthening its world
market position from 0.0.7 to 0.1 percent.- 9 -
While the only small impact of rising oil prices on industrial
production could be easily explained in cases of Chile, Colom-
bia and Tunisia by their favourable domestic energy endowments,
it is surprising that estimates for Singapore and South Korea
point to a rather positive impact. Similar to Brazil and the
Philippines, both economies were highly (South Korea) or even
fully (Singapore) dependent on energy imports; although con-
siderable differences with respect to per-capita-incomes and
shares of industry in gross domestic product existed in the
early seventies, at least industrialization levels were roughly
comparable for all 4 economies later on . The problem thus re-
mains as to how to explain the contrast in oil price effects on
industrial performance in Brazil and the Philippines on the one
hand and South Korea and Singapore on the other? Emphasis should
be laid on marked differences in economic orientation: Whereas
the two first mentioned countries performed an inward-looking
development strategy at least in large parts of the period
under consideration, both South Korea and Singapore are to be
characterized as outward-looking economies, with high shares of
exports in gross domestic product and manufactured goods in
total exports. Furthermore, South Korea and Singapore were the
only countries out of the 7 economies analysed which were sue- ...
cessful in raising world market shares considerably .Estimation
results of equation type I thus indicate that export orienta-
tion provided the most promising adjustment pattern in coping
with the external oil price shock, even on the background of
a slackening world market demand and increasing protectionist
pressures in industrial countries.
In 1979;the share of industry in gross domestic product reached
38 and 35 percent in Brazil and the Philippines, 39 and 36 percent
in South Korea and Singapore; differences in per-capita-income
remained somewhat more pronounced (1780 and 600 US-$ in Brazil
and the Philippines; 1480 and 3 830 US-$ in South Korea and Singa-
pore respectively).
20n an average exports of South Korea and Singapore accounted for 0.4
and 0.6 percent in world exports in the period 1970-73; market
shares climbed to an average of 0.9 and 0.8 percent respectively
in the period 1974-79.- 10 -
Table 3 - Rank Correlation between Selected Economic Indicators
of 7 Developing Countries and the Impact of Rising
Oil Prices on Industrial Production
a
Characteristics
Degree of dependency on
energy imports
Share of oil imports in
total exports
Increase in the share of
oil imports in total ex-
ports
Per-capita-income
Share of mining and manu-
facturing in gross dome-
stic product
Share of exports in gross
domestic product
Share of manufactured ex-
ports in total exports
Type, of equation:
II III IV
Regression coefficient of variable:












































The Spearman coefficient of rank correlation is significant at the 2.5 per-
cent level if marked by """; "" indicates significance at the 5 percent le-
vel; " 10 percent level. A negative sign indicates that the value of parame-
ters declines (i.e. a weaker positive impact of the oil price rise and a
smaller positive shift dummy or a stronger negative impact of rising oil
prices and a greater negative shift dummy) if, for example, the degree of de-
pendency on energy imports increases. The rank correlation coefficients are
put in parentheses if regression coefficients of the corresponding equation
are insignificant to a great part.
This contention is further substantiated if rank correlations
between the value of the oil price coefficient on the one hand
and economic indicators of Table 1 on the other are compared
(Table 3). Only for both criteria concerned with export per-
formance is the Spearman coefficient significant, indicating
a lower negative impact of the oil price rise if the export
share in gross domestic product and, especially, if the share
of manufactured goods in total exports is high.- 11 -
Differences ±n results for Brazil and the Philippines on the
one hand and South Korea and Singapore on the other persist if
allowance is made' for long-term developments in industrial
production (see Table 2 for equation type II). However, the
positive impact of rising oil prices for the two outward-look-
ing countries is reduced (South Korea) or even disappears (Sin-
gapore) ; world market orientation seems to exert its influence
in the long run rather than to be used as a short-term ad-
justment mechanism to external shocks. Nevertheless, the Spear-
man coefficients of rank correlation again stress the importance
of export orientation in limiting negative oil price induced
effects on industrial production. On the other hand, the nega-
tive impact of rising oil prices seems to increase if industria-
lization levels are high and in case of sharp increases in the
share of oil imports in total exports (Table 3).
For Chile, Table 2 reports a considerably stronger negative
coefficient of EP for equation type II than for the first esti-
mation. Yet, it has to be considered that adding a time trend
to the production function may be least adequate in the case of
Chile since a dramatic change in economic policy took place dur-
ing the period of estimation: Efforts in the mid-seventies to
liberalize the trading system fundamentally, obviously leading to
a far greater world-market-oriented industrialization strategy,
may not yet be fully reflected in parameters of equation II,
especially in case of the time trend.
Accounting for an once-and-for-all reduction in industrial produc-
tion caused by the sudden and drastic rise in oil import bills
in 1974 (equations III and IV), the hypothesis according to
which industrialization efforts of NOPECs would have been se-
riously affected in the seventies by considerably higher oil
prices has to be completely rejected: With the exception of- 12 -
Chile in case of equation IV - which, according to the above
reasoning, is of only minor importance - there is no longer any
significantly negative oil price coefficient for the seven
NOPECs analysed. Even for Brazil and the Philippines, where
estimates of types I and II pointed to especially strong nega-
tive influences of the oil price variable, growth of industrial
production was not reduced in the longer run; as in most other
countries the oil price shock of 1973/74 rather caused an
once-and-for-all loss in industry's value added.
The degree of the - usually negative - shift in industrial pro-
duction, again, seems to depend primarily on the performance of
the export sector and the level of industrialization of the
economy: If ranks are correlated between coefficients of the
dummy-variable in type III and country specific characteristics,
the once-and-for-all reduction in industrial production increase
with rising shares of mining and manufacturing in gross domestic
product and with an increasing concentration on raw material
exports; in other words, it is stressed once more that a high
share of manufactured goods in total exports seems to have
helped adjustment to external disturbances.
Generally speaking the above results also hold if it is con-
sidered that higher oil prices - in addition to the direct im-
pact on industrial production - might have caused indirect ef-
fects, for example, by giving rise to an intensified substi-
tution between different factors of production. Estimates pre-
sented in Table 4 indicate that for 5 out of 7 NOPECs neither
the input of capital nor that of labour was negatively affected
by rising oil prices; if industrial production is reduced at
all in these countries by oil price induced adjustment effects,
this process seems to take a rather long time and has not be-

























































































































For specification of variables see the text. The numbers in parentheses beneath the regression coeffi-
cients are the t-values: ""•• indicates significance at the 0.5 percent level; -" 2.5 percent level;
:
c 5 percent level; + 12.5 percent level (one-tailed t-test) .- 14 -
to a lesser degree - in Singapore is a slow-down in capital
formation to be observed because of higher oil prices; in
both cases this was not offset by an extended use of labour.
Probably.the somewhat surprising results pointing to a posi-
tive impact of the oil price rise on industrial production
resulted at least to some extent from the neglect of indirect
effects. As a whole, however, Table 4 supports the view that
negative effects on industrial production are not systemati-
cally underestimated by exclusively dealing with the direct
effects of rising oil prices.
Concluding remarks
Concerned with the seventies, our results indicate that the
hypothesis according to which industrialization prospects of
non-oil developing countries have been seriously affected by
the drastic rise in oil prices of 1973/74 has to be rejected.
The growth of industrial production was not reduced signifi-
cantly for any of the 7 NOPECs analysed; the oil price shock
rather caused an once-and-for-all loss in industrial production,
Especially the outward looking economies characterized by an
already diversified export pattern were successful in limiting
the direct negative effects on industrial production; on the
other hand, they were the only ones for which industrial pro-
duction was affected indirectly by oil price induced adjust-
ment patterns. Finally, there are some indications that the
impact of rising oil prices increases with the level of indu-
strialization already reached. As the importance of industry
in NOPEC-economies will further increase, the influence of
relative oil prices may become more distinct in the future,
though heavily depending on the patterns of industrialization
and, above all, factor intensities chosen.- 15 -
The relevance of these considerations for the NOPECs is per-
haps already becoming evident after the second oil price shock
of 1979/80. It seems to be even more difficult than in the last
decade to reduce seriously enlarged balance of payments defi-
cits without affecting economic growth: Prospects for expanding exports
remain rather gloomy in light of persistently low economic
growth rates in developed countries and protectionist pressures
gaining further ground. On top of this, a growing number of
NOPECs may face balance of payments constraints as they are
already heavily indebted in international financial markets
and creditors are reluctant to provide new loans.Already in 1931 any
number of NOPECs (such as Argentina, Brazil, Ivory Coast and
Morocco) experienced a drastic decline in economic growth
rates, perhaps indicating that it has become increas-
ingly difficult for non-oil developing countries to adjust
their economies to rising oil prices without affecting growth
and further industrialization prospects.
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